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STUDENT NOTES
SUBTERRANEAN LIMITS OF LAND OWNERSHIP
This subject requires a definition of the term "land" Any
attempt to define so'broad a term is difficult. The word'"land",
both in England and America, is a word of general application.
It is nomen generalisszmum and appears in many phases. In its
more limited sense the term denotes the quantity and character of
the interest the tenant may own in the land. Ordinarily, the term
is descriptive of the ownership, and not of the thing owned. Thus,
in its broadest sense, "land" legally embraces much more than the
word literally imports, and includes all things that have become
a part of, or attached to, the soil. Lord Coke, in defining land,
said, in part: "Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefi-
nite extent, upwards as well as downwards. Cutus est solum, ezus
est usque ad coelum et ad rnferos is the maxnn of the law; up-
wards, therefore, no man may erect any building, or the like to
overhang another's land: and downwards, whatever is in a .direct
line, between the surface of any land and the center of the earth
belongs to the owner of the surface; as is every day's experience
in the mning countries."' Coke thus stated an old maxim the origin
of which fades back into antiquity and. which has been adopted
into the common law of both England and: America.
An-exploration into the application of the maxim by modern
-courts reveals an interesting divergence as to the application to
"ezus est usque -ad coelum et ad inferos. 'In recent developments
in dir law, the "ad coeltun" part has not been applied to the air
space,2 and that part of the maxim has become practically mean-
*ingless under modern interpretation. Now, the rights of the owner
of land to the air space above depend on such considerations ts
his own safety and that of his property. Most, if not all of -ile
states have made this departure by statute. How have the courts
applied the ad inferos part of the maxim? In recent American
'cases involving caves, the courts have shown greater disposition to
follow the maxim almost absolutely.'
12 BL. COAnf. 18.
2 -inman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F (2d) 755. (C.C.A. :9th
1936), noted in (1937) 4 Umv. Chi. L. Rev. 480; Smith v. New
England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930), Sweet-
land v. Curtis Airports Corp., 41 F (2d) 927 (D.C. Ohio 1930),
Mod. 55 F (2d) 201 (C.C.A. 6th 1932)
3 Hackley, Trespassers n the Sky (1937) 21 Minn. L. Rev.. 773;
Note (1938) 72 U.S.L. Rev. 185.
'Wyatt v. Mammoth Cave Development Co., 26 F (2d) 332
(1928), Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 212 Ind. 624, 10 N.E. (2d) .917,
7 N.E. (2d) 56 (1937), Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r,, 265 )Ky' 418, 96
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Reliance upon the common law view respecting the ownership
of land, and the assumption that the ownership of a cave is neces-
sarily in the owner of the surface above compelled the Appellate
Court of Indiana to resort to adverse possession of the cave5 by
the defendants in order to transfer the title. The Supreme Court of
Indiana, however, reversed the Appellate Court because the adverse
possession of the defendant did not fulfill the orthodox requirements
that adverse possession be actual, open, notorious, exclusive, con-
tinuous, hostile, and under a claim of right Reliance upon the
same view compelled the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Edwards v.
Sims,7 to affirm a judgment granting an m3unction prohibiting de-
fendant Edwards from trespassing on Sims's land. On final hear-
ing in the Circuit Court, findings were made as to the damages to
which Lee, was entitled. These were to the effect that about one
third of the cave was on or under Lee's land and that he was
therefore entitled to one third of the net proceeds which had been
derived from exhibition during the years, as to which proof had
been offered. A 3udgment was, with corrections in computation,
affirmed
If, however, it could be assumed that the plaintiffs in the
above mentioned cave cases did not own ad nfernos, it would have
been possible for the defendants to have obtained ownership in the
respective caves. In many cases such a holding would be desirable
and could, indeed, be achieved in spite of the ancient maxim. It
is submitted that the early protagomsts of the maxim never intended
it to be taken literally and that they never intended to establish
any rights other than those closely associated with the surface,
because such rights were the only ones contemplated. " The old
sophistry," said Mr. Justice Logan, "that the owner of the surface
of land is the owner of every thing from zenith to nadir must be
reformed, the theory was never true in the past, but no
occasion arose that required the testing of it He owns nothing
which he cannot sub3ect to his dominion." The maxim is authori-
tative only in those 'situations in which it has been accepted and
applied by the courts. In Beardsley v. Hartford" the court said:
"It is a well settled rule that the law varies with the varying reasons
on which it is founded. This is expressed by the maxim, cessante
S.W (2d) 1028 (1936), Edwards v. Sims, 232 Ky. 791, 24 S.W
(2d) 619 (1929). cf Cox. v. Colossal Cavern Co., 210 Ky. 612, 275
S.W 540 (1925).5Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 212 Ind. 624, 10 NE. (2d) 917, 7
N.E. (2d) 56 (1937), cited supra note 4.
1 2 TnxFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) secs. 500-504.
"232 Ky. 791, 24 S.W (2d) 619 (1929).8 Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r., 265 Ky. 418, 96 S.W (2d) 1028 (1936);
Note (1938) 72 U.S.L. Rev. 195.
'Edwards v. Sims, 232 Ky. 791, 799, 24 S.W (2d) 619 (1929);
cited supra note 4, noted in (1938) 72 U.S.L. Rev. 185, 190.
"50 Conn. 542, 47 Am. Rep. 677 (1883).
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ratione, cessat %psa lex. This means that no law can survive the
reasons on winch it is founded. It needs no statute to change it.
It abrogates itself. If the reasons on which a law rests are over-
borne by opposing reasons, which m the progress of society gain
a controlling force the old law, must cease to apply as a con-
trolling principle to the new circumstances." In Katz v Walkrnshaw"
the court said: "whenever it is found that, the application of
a given common law rule by our courts tends constantly to cause
injustice and wrong rather than the administration of justice and
right, then the fundamental principles of right and justice
require that a different rule be adopted."
Aside from any analogy to air law, winch limits the title above
the surface to the extent to winch the owner may reasonably make
use thereof, damages should not have been granted in the cave
cases, because no injury can be shown. If the surface owner has
suffered no injury to himself or property, he should be allowed no
recovery. Even in cases of negligence on the part of the de-
fendant, where no actual injury occurs to the plaintiff or his
property, the courts refuse to allow a recovery even of nominal
damages. =
A sound public policy dictates that the person who owns land
should have no claim to the ownership of a cave which lies so
far beneath the surface that he cannot reasonably expect to reach
and use it. By analogy to the law regulating ownership of space
above the ground, his only right should be that the law be not
used so as to interfere unreasonably with his enjoyment of the
surface.
There is no sound policy in the law which would deny the
right to use property to a person who has the sole access to it
and give that right to one to whom the property is utterly useless.
If the cave is to be of value to anyone, and if the public is to
enjoy the privilege of viewing the natural phenomena therein,
it must be through the efforts of the owner of the apex. His
industry, labor, and expense in utilizing it are sufficient for giv-
ing him present ownership.
If, however, the surface owner has reasonable access, or after-
wards by excavation acquires an opening into the chambers below
he would be entitled to all of the rights to the cave suggested for
the owner of the apex. He would then have all of the benefits
' 141 Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 663, 74 Pac. 766, 64 L.R.A. 236, 99 Am. St.
Rep. 35 (1903).
'Proctor v. Adams, 113 Mass. 376, 18 Am. Rep. 500 (1873)
Sheldon v. Sherman, 42 N.Y. 484, 1 Am. Rep. 569 (1870), Polebitzke
v. John Week Lumber Co., 173 Wis. 509, 181 N.W 730 (1921)
"Farrell v. Waterbury Horse R. R., 60 Conn. 239, 21 Ati. 675,
22 Atl. 544 (1891), Sullivan v. Old Colony Street Railway, 200
Mass. 303, 86 N.E. 511 (1908)
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of the common law rule. He would not be deprived of the right
to excavate and enjoy the subsoil profits, which is a well recognized
right in the law of real property." Mining law has achieved this
desirable result in allowing a miner to follow a vein of ore under
the land of his neighbor where the apex is on the miner's own
land."
,
In a recent New York Case," the existence of a sewer 150 ft.
beneath the surface was held not to be such an incumbrance as
would permit a clain for breach of covenant against incumbrances.
The court said: "It, therefore, appears that the old theory that the
title of an owner of real property extends indefinitely upward and
downward is no longer an accepted principle in its entirety. Title
above the surface is now limited to the extent to which the owner
of the soil may reasonably make use thereof. By analogy, the title
of an owner of the soil will not be extended to a depth below
ground beyond which the owner may not make use thereof."
It would certainly be regrettable to deprive human beings the
right to view the intricate and beautiful handiwork of nature con-
fined within American caves, in order to satisfy a rule anciently
developed without foresight as to its possible consequences.
IRA G. STEPHENSON
COMPROMISE OF CONTRACT CLAIMS-
A CRITICISM OF TANNER V MERRILL
That the law loves a compromise is a familiar maxim. The
Kentucky Court has said' that it is "the peculiar duty of the Courts
of Justice to cherish and support" compromises, for the reason that
they contribute to the peace and quiet of the community.
Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines a compromise as an agree-
ment based on mutual concessions.2 The reasoning of the court is
expressed in terms of consideration since each party has given up
something, frequently the right to have his claim decided in court.3
Three types of fact situations are generally classified as compromises,
although not all of them fit into this definition.
The first is the part payment of an undisputed debt then due.
The creditor may collect the balance by legal action, for there was
no consideration. The debtor did no more than he was bound to
do and the fact that the creditor gave a receipt in full is immatenal.'
1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) sec. 253.12
COSTIGAN, MnING LAW (1908) secs. 113, 114.
2 Boehrmger v Montalton, 142 Misc. 560, 254 N.Y.S. 276 (1931)
'Fisher v May's Heirs, 5 Ky ((2 Bibb) 448, at 450 (1811).
(1930) p. 250.
:Taylor v. Patrick, 4 Ky (1 Bibb) 168 (1808).
N. Y. Insurance Co. v. Van Meter's Adm'r., 137 Ky. 4, 121 S.W
438 (1909), Warren v. Hodge, 121 Mass. 106 (1876), Nixon v. Kiddy,
66 W Va. 355, 66 S.E. 500 (1909)
